God and the Cosmos; a chapter by chapter review: Intro

This is the first post in a little more than two years. About two and one-half years ago, I experienced some health problems. As a result, my doctor and I agreed that I would try testosterone cream. In August of that year I experienced something akin to either panic attacks or severe depression, or both. In any case, I have neither read or written much of anything in the intervening time frame. This post marks an attempt to get back up on that horse.

My father-in-law mentioned that he was reading this book (in the Post Title) in the same phone call that he recommended Particle Fever, a documentary available on Netflix about the LHC. I highly recommending it.

Today I finally started reading God and the Cosmos. Here is the review of the Introduction:
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This is a chapter-by-chapter review of the book God and the Cosmos: Divine Activity in Space, Time and History. The book can be found here: Click here.

The authors are Harry Lee Poe and Jimmy H. Davis. Poe is a theologian and Davis is a chemist. Davis has his PhD in Chemistry from the University of Illinois. Poe's PhD is from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. (He sometimes goes by Hal Poe.)

Introduction: Where is God (Davis)

Davis opens the introduction asking, as I see it, if we can assess the order of the universe through natural means, then where should we expect to find God?

Naturally, as this is the introduction, we don't expect answers here, but rather a reasonable set-up for the rest of the book. My initial impression of Davis' introduction is that he is taking an honest approach. Further reading may or may not confirm this assessment.

It is fair for him to ask that if 100% of an experiment is explainable through natural means, where then may we see God. He cites such luminaries as Aquinas and Augustine to support the idea that God is behind the laws of the universe, that as each experiment shows something of how the universe works, it gives glory to God.

There are signs, however, that at least some of what is to come will be to assign positions to non-believers that are easily mocked. This is the very definition of a straw-man argument (see here). For example, Davis quotes Augustine as saying:

yet by reason of its unbroken continuity, has ceased to cause wonder … And so the vanity of the philosophers has found license to assign these things to other causes, true ones perhaps, but proximate ones.

The troubling aspect of this quote for me, whether it applies to the rest of the book or to Davis' views, is the assertion that non-believers lack wonder. The problems are manifold. For one, it is not evident that wonder is a good thing. For another, I've yet to witness a scientist, believer or otherwise, who lacks wonder in the simple grandness of discovery. There is also a hint in this assertion and similar ones that it is better to remain ignorant and full of wonder than to be knowledgeable and lacking wonder. This sort of pondering I reject out right. As noted, I find that those immersed in scientific discovery have wonder. Second, I've seen no instance in my observations where ignorance is preferable to knowledge. I could be wrong, but the mere thought of choosing ignorance over knowledge is appalling to me.

There is a suggestion in Augustine's quote of argumentum ad hominem. Those that lack wonder (or fail to ascribe it to God) are lacking in character and thus their thoughts do not merit consideration.

A suggestive line of thought in Davis' portion in the introduction is that whatever we discover should direct us to the affirmation of a God. These quotes, whether or B. B. Warfield or Aquinas, presuppose the existence of a god. That is, whatever we find, it points to the providence of God. Again this is a presupposition. “Nothing can be as it is without God, therefore everything tells us about God.” Yet without evidence there is no reason to suppose a god is behind it at all. (Here I betray my biases.)

Why should one start with the idea of a god? Should not one make observations about the universe and draw natural conclusions about what it is that one sees? Is it at all reasonable to suppose that because one does not understand what one observes that one should posit a supernatural cause—a cause beyond human understanding? How often has that been proven a wrong approach. One thinks of Zeus as an explanation for lightening.

Davis complains that naturalists confuse the model with reality. I struggle to see why he makes this assertion. That he wants to allow for a god is no reason to add a god to the model when the model sufficiently exemplifies reality. What would adding a god to the chemistry experiment (in the opening of his part of the introduction), add to what actually happened in that experiment? What would adding a god to gravity add to our understanding of the procession of planets around the Sun?

It is true that natural explanations to not necessitate the disbelief in a god, however there is no reason to add a god. Adding a god adds nothing to understanding; indeed, one might suggest that it inhibits exploration and, hence, real understanding.

Introduction: Where is God (Poe)

Poe starts by suggesting that this book is not so much a questions as to whether a god exists but rather that if God exists how does he interact with the world.

This is comforting, to a degree, because I find that my guess that the authors were presupposing a god is accurate. I'm not sure how a non-believer, such as myself, responds to a book with this presupposition. The fundamental assumption is questionable. I'm not sure how to move forward. But we shall see …

Poe asks questions such as, how did we conceive of a god if there were no god of which to conceive? A cursory scan of his texts hints that he finds naturalistic explanations for how humans believe in gods inadequate. He doesn't explain why here in the introduction, but it does betray a kind of argumentum ad incredulum; I cannot believe that X is true so I am justified in believing Y, even without evidence, is true.

Poe brings up C. S. Lewis' contention that we envision a a good god In spite of the apparent evil in the world is nonsensical if in fact there were no such god in actuality. Without spending a whole lot of time on it, it seems rather apparent how such things might be. We observe that the world has patterns. We also note that we cannot (or can not yet) perceive how those patterns might be. Humans have ever remanded obfuscated reality to the purview of the supernatural. Having supposed that everyday events, such as one's prize cow giving sour milk, are due to the mood of an arbitrary god, one grants that every action can either appease or antagonize such a being. Every tribe supposes that the successful conquering of another tribe indicates the benevolence of its god. It further supposes the impotence and/or the malevolence (toward the conquered tribe) of the other tribe's god. If we fail in conquering, then we have done something to merit the disfavor of our god. It could not be that simply weren't prepared for battle. It could not be that their gods are superior. It must be that we displeased our god. And so we make amends. And it is either enough or not. (See the Bible story of Achan: Joshua 7.) A natural understanding of the human belief in a benevolent god is far from bemusing. (One might also point out that the Judeo-Christian belief in a benevolent god is not supported by their scriptures.) If and when we then succeed, we maintain that our god is benevolent. This is also indicative of confirmation bias: We remember the successes and forget the failures.

Then Poe says this: Beauty, justice, goodness, and love simply aren't natural. My reply: Horseshit! I am also reminded of Christopher Hitchens saying: That which is asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.

The rest of Poe's section surveys various takes on how God might interact with the universe. He suggests that various Christian suggestions might be incomplete if they suppose that only certain aspects/persons of the Trinity interact with various aspects of the universe.

I should re-state, if I allow a presupposition of God's existence, I have little to say. It is not an axiom I can grant. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to take the book as it comes.

Summary:

First, the authors appear to be prepared to ignore the question of whether a god exists or not and presuppose his/her/its existence. Given this assumption, the question they propose to address is that given God's existence, how does this god interact with the universe.

The introduction, it should be noted, is not the book. However, I suspect that the majority of the book will consist of thoughts along the lines of “I cannot accept that God does not exist, therefore he/she/it does”, and “If you cannot show that God interacts with the universe, we are justified in supposing he does.”

I hope I am wrong.